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In the Supreme Court of 
the. State of Utah 
P. K. EDMUNDS, ELLA M. ED-
MUNDS, CHARLO·TTE EDMUNDS, 
a minor, FRANKLIN EDMUNDS, a 
minor, JOHN EDMUNDS, a mino'r 
and ANN EDMUNDS, a minor, by 
their guardian ad litem,', ELLA M. 
EDMUNDS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
KENNETH GERMER, JED R. AB-
BOTT, and DAVID R. WALDRON, 
partners, doing business under the firm 
name of GERMER, ABBOTT & W AL-
DRON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
9349 
DEFENDANTS AN;D APPELLANTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from six judgments entered against 
appellants in favor of the respondents on the 9th day of 
March, 1960, in the District Court of Ir~n County, Utah, 
for a total sum of $16,000.00, upon verdicts returned by 
a jury. From this point on, appellants elect to refer to 
respondents as they are designated below. 
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The plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, recovered judgment 
for $11,500.00. The plaintiff, Ella M. Edmunds, recovered 
for $2500.00 and each of the other plaintiffs for $500.00 
(R. 88-99). Suit was commenced on the 6th day of July, 
1959. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, defendants 
moved for directed verdicts and also at the conclusion of the 
evidence before submission of the case to the jury (Tr. 
2 0 5-2 0 8, 3 13 ) . Both of these motions were taken under 
advisement and subsequently were denied, along with 
defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdicts and for a new trial (R. 107). 
These judgments were for personal injuries sustained 
in an automobile accident which occurred on November 
27, 1955 on an abandoned section of U. S. Highway 91, 
about 1 Yz miles North of the town of Paragonah, Utah 
(Tr. 21-2). 
The defendants were the successful bidders on a 
contract with the Utah State Road Commission and were 
constructing a section of new highway, U. S. 91, in Iron 
County, which paralleled the old U. S. Highway 91 for 
some 12 miles (Ex. 12, Tr. 243). This new highway was 
completed and was in use by the travelling public several 
weeks before the day of the accident. (Tr. 211-212, 220, 
263). 
The old section of highway had been cut in 20 places 
to provide for irrigation and drainage and was fenced off 
at various points throughout its length at six places, so 
that it was no longer useable for travel (Tr. 288-9, 255, 
257, 296-7). 
In the course of the trial the question arose as to 
whether all of these cuts in the old road had been made 
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prior to the 19th of November, 1955 or if some may have 
been made after the accident, in the following spring. 
Defendants' testimony was that they were all made before 
the 19th of November, 1955. If so, it would have been 
impossible for plaintiff Edmunds to have driven his auto-
mobile as far on the old road as he claims he travelled before 
encountering difficulty. Defendants regard this question 
as of small ·Consequence in view of the uncontradicted fact 
that Edmunds drove on this old road for some distance 
before driving into one of these cuts. This latter point is 
the only fact on this phase of the case of any importance. 
The accident occurred on a Sunday afternoon between 
3:30 and 4:00 p.m., when the plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, 
took his wife and four of his children and their guest for 
an automobile ride. (Tr. 216). They left from their home 
in Cedar City and drove North through Paragonah to 
where this new section of highway had been constructed 
and where Edmunds owned land on both sides of the high-
way. According to the plaintiffs' testimony, in proceeding 
North from Paragonah the plaintiffs travelled on the new 
section of highway from the point of confluence of the 
old and new roads for a distance of about a mile (Tr. 96). 
They travelled to about the North line of plaintiff Ed-
munds' land, where they turned East on an access road 
leading from the new highway to the East right-of-way 
line where Edmunds owned property. They then turned 
around and drove West on an access road leading to prop-
erty on the West side of the right-of-way, crossed the new 
highway and drove only as far as the abandoned road, where 
they turned South on this old road and drove to the point of 
accident (Tr. 94-98, 186-7). 
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As has been stated, plaintiff P. K. Edmunds owned land 
West of U. S. Highway 91. He wanted to see this land as 
well as his property East of the new highway and to show 
it to his guest. However, it was not necessary for him to 
use the old road in order to reach his property on the West. 
He had been provided with an access road to it pursuant 
to contract with the State Road Commission and could, 
had he chosen, have travelled South on the new road to 
his access road and this would have been as convenient for 
his purposes as the old highway (Tr. 143-145, 158). Mter 
seeing his property and perhaps even making a brief stop 
on the old road, he continued to drive South on this old 
road. After leaving his property, he could have returned 
to the new road, which he knew to be a much better high-
way, from at least two places (Tr. 102, 152-3 ). He chose 
not to do so and continued on until he ran into a drainage, 
cut, located a few hundred feet North of the point where 
the old road, if still in existence, would have joined the 
highway again to the South (Tr. 104, 174, 192). 
Plaintiff Ella Edmunds testified that she expected that· 
her husband would use one of the access roads available to 
return to the new highway (Tr. 192). 
Edmunds saw this cut in the old road but mistook it 
for an access road to his property until too late to stop 
and avoid running into it (Tr. 98-9). He claims that 
immediately before the accident he had been driving at 
about 45 miles per hour (Tr. 112). 
This old road at the point of the accident and for a 
considerable distance in both directions was practically 
straight. It was also level. The weather was good, the 
surface of the old road was dry and it was broad daylight. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Visibility was unlimited and, according to the testimony, 
the driver was looking straight ahead (Tr. 43, 175, 186, 
216, 295). Objects and road conditions could be observed 
at a great distance (Tr. 187-8). 
According to the investigating officer, the. cut was 
plainly visible (Tr. 44). This officer found where the 
driver had laid down 50 feet ofheayy skid marks leading 
up to the edge_ of the cut (Tr.- 27). 
The cut into whi.ch Edmunds plunged his car was 27 
feet wide at the top and about 4Yi feet deep by actual 
measurement (Tr. 262). · 
Other testimony concerning its width and depth, 
including tha,t of plaintiff P. K. Edmunds, estimated the 
cut varied from 20 feet wide to 10 to 12 feet wide and. 
from 2Yi to 8 feet deep (Tr. 42, 101). The sides of the 
cut were not abrupt, but were sloping. The car came to 
rest with its rear end in the bottom and the front end on 
the South bank of the cut (Tr. 24, 46, 47, 101, 214). 
The defendant contractors were not working on the 
project the day of the accident, but had been ordered to 
discontinue work until spring due to adverse weather con-
ditions. The shut-down began November 19, 1955 (Tr. 
202-3, 225-229, 232, 233, Ex. 15, Ex. 17). The defend-
ants had also removed all of their men and equipment from 
the job site (Tr. 45, 148, 149, 258, 259, 292, 293). By 
November 19, 1955, all of the work on the project covered 
by the contract had been completed, with the exception 
of the scarification of the surface of the old road in order 
to encourage growth of vegetation (Tr. 246, 293). 
The plaintiffs contend that they were given no warn-
ing of the cuts in the old road or that it had been with-
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drawn from use by the public and that the defendant 
contractors had failed to post adequate warnings or bar-
ricades at the scene of the accident. The record in this 
case fairly establishes the following facts: 
The plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, owner of some of the 
land through which the new section of highway was to 
be constructed, had sold a portion of his land to the State 
of Utah to provide a right-of-way on which the new high-
way could be built (Tr. 95, 96, 143, 144, 157). Hence 
he knew of the plans of the state to construct a new road. 
Also, during all of the months that construction was going 
on, he was travelling this section of the highway frequently 
in going to and from his farm and travelling North as far 
as Salt Lake City (Tr. 142-3). Early in November, 1955, 
he had made a visit to his farm. Although he had no recol-
lection of driving on the new highway and was unable to 
say when the new section had been opened for public 
travel, he undoubtedly used the new road on this occasion 
(Tr. 146-148). As we have already pointed out, this new 
road had been in use and non-use of the old abandoned 
road had been in effect from the end of September, 1955-
two months before the accident (Tr. 211, 213, 220, 263). 
Edmunds was unable to definitely deny that he had trav-
elled on the new road before the date of the accident. There 
is no question about his knowledge that the new road was 
in use on November 27, 1955, inasmuch as by his own 
statement, he used it on that day in travelling to the North 
line of his property (Tr. 184). 
From the date when the new road was opened, there 
is ample evidence that no traffic, except Edmunds' car, 
made any attempt to use the old road after the new high-
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way was opened for travel (Tr. 44, 45, 152, 153, 156, 212, 
234, 268). On the day when the accident occurred, he 
was also aware that his was the only vehicle attempting to 
use the old highway. He gave no thought whatever to this 
significant fact as a warning of possible danger to himself 
and his family (Tr. 75). 
Furthermore, for weeks before the accident, the old 
highway was completely torn up and obliterated and bar-
ricaded on the North end so that traffic could not even 
drive to it from the North (Tr. 210, 212, 222, 223, 231). 
On the South end a large sign and barricade, 16 feet long 
and 4Yz feet high, was placed squarely across where the 
old road had been. This sign and barricade was directly 
in front of Edmunds as he drove North and turned slightly 
to the East onto the new road. This sign was marked in 
large luminous letters ((ROAD CLOSED" and ((DE-
TOUR." There is no evidence that contradicts the defend-
ants' evidence that this sign at the South end of the old 
road was in place and in plain view on the date of the 
accident (Ex. 18, Tr. 38, 39, 41, 42,224,231-233,242, 
264-266). The only thing Edmunds says about this bar-
ricade is that he did not see it on the day of the accident 
as he drove North, but he refused to deny that it was there 
(Tr. 41-42, 113, 150-151). In addition, over 200 feet of 
the old road, where it had been joined to the highway on 
the South, had been entirely removed and obliterated in 
October of 1955 and could not possibly have been used for 
travel. This was evident to anyone taking the trouble to 
even look. It would have been impossible for Edmunds to 
drive onto the old road from the South because of this 
condition (Tr. 24-25, 224-25, 233-35, 267-68). The cut 
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into which Edmunds drove his car was made by the defend-
ants under the direction and supervision of the resident 
engineer, who designated to the contractors the points at 
which all of the cuts were to be made. Their purpose was 
to provide drainage away from the new roadway and in 
some instances for irrigation purposes. (Tr. 226-233, 240, 
241, 244, 257). All of the cuts were readily discernible 
to anyone travelling on the new road, which was only about 
100 feet East of the old roadway (Tr. 22, 187, 188, 212). 
In addition, at six points on the right-of-way, fences had 
been constructed across this old road and three of these 
fences crossed the old highway South of Lunt Park, located 
about 5 miles North of the South end of the project (Tr. 
222, 223, 266, 267, 269, 284). In addition, there were 
roadblocking barricades and signs located at four different 
points at public cross-roads on the old right-of-way to 
warn the public not to travel on the old highway (Tr. 289). 
As has been above stated, all operations of the defend-
ants had been suspended by order of the State Road Com-
mission, on November 19, 1955; prior to this date the 
resident engineer made an inspection of the project and 
ordered the defendants to take certain action in preparation 
to suspend operations (Ex. 17, Tr. 227-28). Afterwards, 
he made another inspection and satisfied himself that all 
of his requirements had been met and thereupon issued the 
suspension order (Ex. 15, Tr. 225, 248-49). Inspection by 
him included a determination that defendants had con-
structed the necessary fences and had installed or repaired 
and placed all signs required to insure the safety of the 
public (Tr. 225, 227, 243). Under these conditions the 
work was suspended on November 19, 1955 and the de-
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fendants left the project for the winter, and the State Road 
Commission took over and assumed control until the fol-
lowing spring (Tr. 207). No suspension order would have 
been issued unless the defendants had fully complied with 
all of the requirements of the resident engineer (Tr. 249). 
After the suspension order became effective the defendants 
were not allowed to do any further work until ordered 
by the engineer (Tr. 272). The scarification of the surface 
of the old road was not a part of the work required before 
suspension of work. (Ex. 17, Tr. 203). 
On the question of the erection of signs or barricades 
at drainage cuts, or on approach roads crossing the old 
highway, the resident engineer testified that contractors 
were never required to construct them (Tr. 249-50). 
The plaintiffs, P. K. Edmunds and Ella Edmunds, seek 
to excuse the conduct of P. K. Edmunds by claiming that 
the appearance of the old roadway was deceptive in that 
the cut where the accident happened was mistaken by him 
for an access road covered with blacktop which would lead 
to the new highway. He admits that he saw it, but mistook 
it for an access road. The facts, however, are that there 
was no blacktopping at all near this cut, nor was any access 
road located near this point (Tr. 299). Edmunds admitted 
that he did not know if blacktopping on the access roads 
extended all the way to the property lines (Tr. 160). 
The evidence is uncontradicated that at least half of 
the access roads provided by the state in this area were only 
blacktopped for a distance of 20 to 25 feet from the new 
highway and the rest of the way to the property line on 
these access roads the surface was the natural soil of the 
area (Tr. 230-231, 298-299). 
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That these plaintiffs were guilty of inattention is 
attested by the fact that they were engaged in pointing 
out the countryside to their guest, an activity in which 
P. K. Edmunds admitted that he participated (Tr. 151). 
It is essential to make some reference to the injuries 
of the various plaintiffs. The four children involved re-
ceived only negligible bruises and perhaps one of them 
had a small cut or two. They were superficially examined 
by their father, P. K. Edmunds, who is a physician, at the 
accident scene. They were never hospitalized and their 
injuries required no treatment whatsoever. No medical or 
other expense of any kind was ever incurred in treating 
them or any of the plaintiffs (Tr. 178, 182, 183, 189). 
The plaintiff, Ella Edmunds, received a bump on the 
back of the head and on the lower back and a twisted ankle 
(Tr. 177). She reluctantly went for an X-ray examination 
the day following the accident (Tr. 180). She had no 
further examination and no treatment. She treated herself 
with a few aspirin and some sedatives (Tr. 180, 190, 191). 
There were no fractures involved and her injuries had all 
disappeared in three to four weeks (Tr. 180-182). Fol-
lowing the accident, she carried on her usual household 
duties, caring for her husband and eight children (Tr. 
181). She herself described her injuries as not serious and 
herself as fully recovered in a few weeks (Tr. 188, 189, 
190, 191). Both Mrs. Edmunds and the children were 
taken home from the accident scene by a passer-by in a 
car (Tr. 101-102). They got into and out of his car with-
out any assistance and presented no appearance of any 
injury (Tr. 215-216). They made no complaints of injury 
to him during the ride home (Tr. 217). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENTS: 
(a) BECAUSE DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY 
OF NO ACT OF NEGLIGENCE CAUSING 
INJURY TO· PLAINTIFFS. 
(b) BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF, P. K. 
EDMUNDS, WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT IN FAVO·R OF 
PLAINTIFF, P. K. EDMUNDS, FOR THE REASON 
THAT SAID PLAINTIFF WAS GUlL TY O·F NEGLI-
GENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
NEW TRIAL AS TO PLAINTIFFS ELLA M. ED-
MUNDS, CHARLOTTE EDMUNDS, FRANKLIN 
EDMUNDS, JOHN EDMUNDS and ANN EDMUNDS, 
FOR THE REASON THAT THE DAMAGES 
AWARDED TO· SAID PLAINTIFFS ARE EXCESSIVE, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT CO·MMITTED ERROR IN 
ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 2, 9, 12 AND 17. 
PO,INT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT CO·MMITTED ERROR IN 
ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS RE-
QUESTED BY DEFENDANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENTS: 
(a) BECAUSE DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY 
OF NO· ACT OF NEGLIGENCE CAUSING 
INJURY TO PLAINTIFFS. 
(b) BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF, P. K. 
EDMUNDS, WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES. 
The first proposition relied upon by defendants is that 
they were guilty of no negligent act causing injury to 
plaintiffs. 
The alleged negligence relied upon by plaintiffs is that 
defendants wrongfully and negligently caused and per-
mitted a hole or excavation to exist in a public road, with-
out placing any barricades or signs at the point where the 
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hole and excavation was made to warn and prevent persons 
from using said road. It is conceded by defendants that at 
the place of accident no barricade or sign was erected by 
them. It is not conceded, however, that the place of acci-
dent was in any sense of the term a public road. The 
record is ·Without dispute that the place of accident had 
been withdrawn from use as a highway by the State of 
Utah several weeks before the date of the accident. The 
accident occurred on the 27th of November, 1955. The 
new road constructed by the defendants was taken over 
and placed in use by the state in the last week of September, 
1955. 
Proof that the old section of highway had been 'with-
drawn is the undisputed fact that barricades and signs had 
been placed and erected in at least four places on the old 
highway. This was done at the North and South ends of 
the abandoned road and at two other locations in between, 
where the old highway was crossed by other public roads 
(Tr. 264, 266, 288). Signs at each of these points warned 
the public that the old road was closed. Furthermore, there 
were right-of-way fences which crossed the old highway at 
six different points and which also constituted a barrier 
and a warning that the old road was no longer to be trav-
elled (Tr. 284). Three of these fences were South of Lunt 
Park (Tr. 222-223). As further warning to the public 
that the old highway was abandoned and withdrawn from 
use, both the South and the North ends thereof had been 
completely obliterated and removed, so that on the day 
of the accident it was perfectly evident that the old road 
no longer constituted a highway. This obliteration on the 
North end, was for a distance of a hundred feet and, at 
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the South end, for a distance of two hundred to two hun-
dred and fifty feet (Tr. 224-225, 267-68). Even this 
was not all. The old road had been cut through in twenty 
pla.ces by cuts which vary from twenty to thirty feet wide, 
further indicating that it was no longer a highway. These 
cuts could readily be seen from the new highway which 
was only about a hundred feet to the East from where the 
old highway had been. Three to five of these cuts were 
located between the North line of the Edmunds property 
and the point of accident, a distance of about a mile and 
a half (Tr. 301). 
All of the cuts through the old highway, according 
to the testimony of defendants and the State Highway 
Engineer were made before the 19th of November, 1955 
(Tr. 244-257). Finally, the new section of highway was 
open and in use for at least seven weeks before the date of 
accident. 
The effectiveness of the measures taken by the de-
fendants and the State of Utah to give notice to the public 
that the old road was no longer to be used is eloquently 
attested by the undisputed fact that all traffic on the high-
way used the new section of road from the time it was 
opened in the last week of September until the date of 
accident. Testimony in the record is that not one auto-
mobile was ever seen attempting to use the old road from 
the time the new road was opened. Plaintiff Edmunds was 
the only member of the public known to attempt such 
use (Tr. 44-45, 212). On the day when he .made use of 
the old road to his misfortune, he noted that no one else 
was following his example (Tr. 156 ) and furthermore, 
on the day of the accident, in travelling to the North line 
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of his property, he himself used the new road (Tr. 96). 
As has been noted, plaintiffs complain because no bar-
ricade or sign was erected at the point where they ran into 
a drainage cut in the old road. We point out that if it was 
the duty of defendants to erect a sign and barricade at this 
point, they should have likewise done the same thing at 
every other point where the old road had been cut for drain-
age or to provide an irrigation channel. Since there were 
twenty of these cuts, this would have required the erection 
of forty signs and barricades on this old road. No provision 
of the contract required such action by the defendants and 
the engineer in charge of the project testified that highway 
contractors were never required to take such precautions 
(Tr. 249-250). We know of no case imposing such a bur-
densome duty upon a state or highway contractor. 
Plaintiffs also complain that because there was no 
sign posted at the point where they drove from a private 
access road onto the old highway, warning them the old 
road was unsafe, defendants were negligent. The private 
roadways or access roads on this highway were located 
every 2100 feet along the new highway (Tr. 286). 
No case we know of imposes a burden upon a state 
or highway contractor to place signs or barricades on an 
abandoned highway at every point where it is crossed 
by a private driveway or access road. To impose such a 
burden would be unreasonable and intolerable. So far as 
we are aware the requirements of reasonable safety are 
met if such a road is barricaded and signed at its ends and 
where it is intersected by public roads. The evidence is 
uncontradicted that at every such point the old highway 
had been barricaded and signed giving such warning. 
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In the contract between the state and the defendant 
contractors there is a provision which is part of the 
Standard Specifications requirin~ contractors to provide 
and maintain necessary signs and barricades for the safety 
of the public (Ex. 12, Standard Specifications 1-7.10, page 
3 9) . This specifi.ca tion, however, does not define nor par-
ticularize any standard of compliance and, we submit, 
will not support the contention of the plaintiffs that signs 
and barricades should have been erected at all the points 
where they contend they should have been placed. 
On November 19, 1955, the work of the defendants 
was suspended due to weather and seasonal conditions, 
which made such suspension necessary. Work ceased upon 
an order issued by the resident engineer (Tr. 202-3, 225, 
Ex. 15) . From this date no further work was done by 
the defendants or permitted by the state until June 28, 
1956 (Ex. 16). Before work ceased on November 19, 
1955, the engineer in charge for the state made an inspec-
tion of the project · to determine what had to be done 
before the work could be closed down. He made certain 
requirements by written instructions (Tr. 227, Ex. 17). 
He came back to the project afterwards and before issuing 
his suspension order made a determination that all of his 
requirements, including safety precautions, had been car-
ried out (Ex. 15, Tr. 225-227). It is to be observed that 
he especially satisfied himself as to the erection of signs 
and barricades and the work was not allowed to cease until 
he was fully satisfied. 
It is earnestly submitted that the best criterion of 
reasonable care on the part of defendants in regard to the 
placing of barriers and signs lies in the action of the com-
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petent state officials charged with the duty of supervising 
the construction of public highways and possessing knowl-
edge and experience qualifying then: to be the best judges 
of what would constitute adequate safety measures on a 
road project. 
No attempt was ever made by plaintiffs to show that 
the precautions. carried out by the defendants under the 
orders of the State of Utah were not adequate, nor was 
any testimony introduced by which it appeared by com-
petent opinion that the defendants had failed in any re-
spect. The case was simply permitted to go to the jury, 
composed of unskilled laymen, to determine whether the 
defendants were negligent because they did not erect signs 
or barricades at every private crossing or cut made through 
the old abandoned highway, and only erected such signs 
and barricades as the state required. No instruction was 
given to the jury as a guide, other than a general instruc-
tion that the jury could find in favor of the plaintiffs if 
they found negligence on the part of the defendants in 
leaving a trench or excavation in a roadway unguarded 
by a barricade or sign to warn travelers of the danger 
(Instruction No.9, R. 75). Another instruction was given, 
which defendants assert was palpably error, which 
stated that it was the duty of the defendants to use reason-
able care to exclude public travel from that portion of 
the roadway made impassable and dangerous by the drain-
age ditch and to erect barricades and warning signs and 
that failure to do so would constitute negligence (In-
struction No. 12, R. 78). We shall have more to say 
hereafter concerning these instructions. 
The evidence is manifestly clear that the old section 
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of road was no longer a public highway on the day of the 
accident. The case went to the jury on the undisputed 
testimony that defendants,.cut a drainage ditch in the old 
highway pursuant to the requirements of their contract 
and plaintiffs ran into this ditch in broad daylight, which 
they admit they saw, but which they claim they mistook 
for a private crossing from the new highway to private 
property West of the right-of-way. We contend that 
this evidence is insufficient to support any finding of 
negligence chargeable to defendants. 
One of the provisions of the Standard Specifications 
gave the State Road Highway Engineer in charge sole 
discretion to make all decisions as to the work to be per-
formed and as to the manner of performance (Ex. 12, 
Standard Specifications 1-5.1, page 23). We submit that 
this right of decision vested in the engineer should be 
binding upon the plaintiffs until a showing is made that 
he failed to perform his duty and that it was error under 
these circumstances to permit the jury to make a finding 
of negligence. Had the defendants gone ahead and erected 
barricades and signs at the places where plaintiffs, by 
hindsight, now claim they should have been placed, they 
would have been obliged to do so at their own cost and 
expense, since no provision of the contract or order of 
the engineer in charge required this to be done, nor made 
any provision for payment if it was done. 
Another point illustrating the injustice of the judg-
ments against the defendants is that they were held liable 
for the condition of an abandoned road over which they 
had no control when the accident occurred. From the 
19th of Noven'lber, 1955, when the above described sus-
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pension order went into effect, the defendants were no 
longer on this project doing any work nor were they 
charged with any responsibility of any kind during this 
period of time. This was the period during which the 
State of Utah assumed sole responsibility for the project. 
Section 1-4.5 of the Standard Specifications, pages 21 and 
22, provided ((When construction operations are sus-
pended by written order of the engineer for seasonal 
conditions ~~- ~:- * for which the contractor is not respon-
sible, maintenance of the road under traffic including 
signs and barricades, etc., shall be performed by and at 
the expense of the Commission during the period of 
suspension. * :~o ::- necessary signs and barricades as pro-
vided by the contractor shall be left in place during the 
time of suspension." (Ex. 12, Standard Specifications). 
It is submitted that, under this provision of the 
contract, on the date of the accident, the state, under its 
suspension order (Ex. 15) having assumed control of the 
project, it was the duty of the Road Commission to 
provide and maintain any necessary safety devices and 
precautions on this highway or its adjacent appurtenances 
and that the defendants were consequently relieved of such 
responsibility and of all liability in connection therewith. 
If the defendants had failed in any regard to perform 
some portion of the contract with respect to safety, then 
the state should have done the necessary work at the con-
tractors' expense. This same provision of the Standard 
Specifications further provided: cc::. ::- ::-,the engineer shall 
perform at the contractors' expense, such work which, 
in the engineer's opinion, is necessary to provide a satis-
factory condition for traffic. ::- ::- ::- " 
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We anticipate that plaintiffs will argue that th~ re-
sponsibility of the contractors continued until final ac-
ceptance and since this 'project had not been finally 
accepted, the responsibility of defendants' was a continuing 
one under the provisions of the, contract. The following 
cases and authorities hold that in instances where a new 
highway lias beeri taken over by a public body which as-
sumes control of it and places traffic thereon, that at that 
time . accepta'nce for all practical purposes is complete 
and such acceptance relieves the contractor of any liability 
for accidents occurtlng after the date of such practical 
acceptance: 
Donaldson vs. Jones, Washingt$n, 61 Pac. 2, 1007 
Memphis Asphalt Co. v. Fleming, Ark. 132 SW 222 
13 ALR 2, 191, pages 211, 219 
58 ALR 2, 865, pages 876, 878 
In this case, the new section of highway had been 
accepted by the state and had been put in public use and 
this occurred in the last week of September, 1955, at which 
time the new highway was fully completed (Tr. 220-221). 
After November 19, 1955, all that remained for the con-
tractor to perform was to return when weather condi-
tions permitted to break up the surface of the old road 
to encourage the growth of vegetation thereon (Tr. 293-
294). 
Since defendants were guilty of no negligence causing 
injury to plaintiffs and since they owed no duty to plain-
tiffs on the day of the accident, it naturally follows that 
the sole proximate cause of injury was the negligence of 
plaintiff P. K. Edmunds, driver of the vehicle which 
plunged into the drainage cut. It is defendant's conten-
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tion that his negligence was the sole cause of injury 
and that consequently none of the plaintiffs should be 
entitled to recover. 
In Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, 85 Utah 79, 38 
P 2, 743, it was contended that a road contractor had 
failed to erect and maintain a suitable barricade across 
a new highway under construction and to properly light 
it. In that case, as here, an automobile was driven into 
an excavation. This court held that the barricade was 
sufficient to discharge the contractor's duty and further 
that the guest plaintiff could not recover from the con-
tractor because his injuries were caused by the negligence 
of the driver alone. See O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 
213 P. 791. We submit that th~se cases support our 
contention on the question of proximate cause. 
That plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, was negligent, is in-
controvertibly demonstrated in the record. First of all, 
he departed from a safe and designated highway free of 
obstruction and hazard to travel at his own risk upon an 
abandoned road which he knew, or in the exercise of rea-
sonable care, should have discovered, was no longer open 
for public travel. He was aware that the new section of 
highway was in use, having used it himself, and saw all 
of the travelling public using it ·exclusively. 
It had been held by this court that where a street 
is laid out and is plainly designated for travel and is 
adequate, there is no duty to keep the undesignated portion 
of the right-of-way free from danger. A traveller depart-
ing from the designated way intentionally does so at his 
own peril. There are no implied assurances that the un-
designated portions are free from obstructions or danger. 
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This court said, in Jensen v. Logan City·, 89 Utah 
347, page 372, 57 P2 708 H:'.- ::- ::- where one ceases by 
deliberation or intention to use the designated portion he 
can no longer be reasonably using it and he goes thereafter 
on his own responsibility." See also Herndon v. Salt Lake 
City, 34 Utah 65, p. 81; 95 Pac. 646. 
It is argued by plaintiffs that the old highway had 
the appearance of a road open and fit for travel and 
hence the plaintiffs had an implied right to use it. The 
fallacy in this argument lies in the fact that plaintiff 
P. K. Edmunds ignored all of the obvious signs and warn-
ings, which we have heretofore mentioned, that this old 
highway was no longer a public road. He ignored the 
sign stating that the road was closed. This was not a little 
sign, difficult to see, it was 16 ft. long and 4Yz ft. high 
and made of heavy timbers (Ex. 18, Tr. 264-65). It cov-
ered most of the entire width of what had been the old 
highway and was placed squarely across the center of it 
(Tr. 38-39, 41). P. K. Edmunds ignored completely the 
fact that all the travelling public but himself was using 
the new highway. He disregarded the plain indication 
given by the fact that the entire South end of the old 
road had been destroyed for 250 feet where it had for-
n1erly been part of the highway. Finally, if he had been 
alert and observant as he should have been, he would 
have seen that the old road was cut in many places. 
This was plainly visible from the new highway only 100 
feet away. This is not a case where no indications existed 
which a traveller could reasonably be expected to see, 
giving him warning of danger. 
The final answer to plaintiffs' claim that they were 
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justified in using the old road lies in the fact that in 
broad daylight, on a level, straight surface, with no ob-
struction to vision and unlimited visibility, Edmunds ran 
his car into a trench 27 feet wide and 4Yz feet deep. No 
extenuating circumstance excused such conduct. He tes-
tified that he was looking straight ahead at the time, 
driving 45 miles per hour. Seated in the driver's seat 
and looking ahead and down at the surface over which 
he travelled, he could have seen the break in the surface 
for hundreds of feet, had he looked or paid attention. 
A plane drawn from the edge of the cut in a straight line 
to eye level of a driver seated in a car would have revealed 
the far bank of the cut long before it was reached. This 
is an inescapable physical fact. Eye level would have been 
at least 4Yz feet above the surface of the old road. 
Furthermore, P. K. Edmunds was not a stranger to 
the area. He had observed a new highway under con-
struction in the area for months and had provided part 
of the right of way on which it was built. When the 
new road was opened, which he knew had occurred, he 
was bound to know that the old road was no longer 
intended for travel. We do not have a case here of a 
road being taken out of use without any warning to the 
public and without any other means of travel provided 
obvious to all travellers. Here we are confronted with 
the case of a new highway paralleling an old one at a 
distance of a hundred feet and which was in plain view, 
plainly and obviously indicated as the highway which 
should be used and which every other traveller was using. 
All the cases imposing liability for failure to warn of an 
abandoned highway are cases in which the public had 
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been given no reasonable notice that abandonment had 
taken place. 
Here we merely have a case involving a driver who 
was inattentive, engaged in showing a guest ·the features 
of the surrounding country and his own property and 
not maintaining proper lookout. ( T r. 151 ) . 
To relieve the plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, of the stigma 
of negligence an attempt was ·made to show that he 
was deceived into thinking that the cut through the old 
highway, which, by his own admission, he saw, was an 
access road or private crossing, providing access to private 
lands from the new highway. He described it as appearing 
to him to be a blacktop surface. The facts are that there 
was no blacktop in the area of the cut and hence the 
cut would have had the color of the natural soil of the 
area. There is no evidence in the record that the natural 
color of the soil was black. 
Hereafter we will cite many decisions which this 
and other courts have decided imposing the duty upon 
travellers and drivers to look where they are going and 
charging them with the duty to see what is plain to be 
seen. A party will not be heard to say that he could not 
or did not see what reasonable diligence would disclose. 
The cut into which P. K. Edmunds drove his automobile 
was not narrow or small or concealed, nor was it just a 
cut capriciously .n1ade by the defendants which they dug 
and went away and forgot about. It was a part of the 
structure of the new highway and was vital to its life 
and maintenance and was a permanent part of the high-
way project itself. 
A Utah decision exemplifying the duty of a driver 
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to look is found in Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390, 
216 P. 2 640. tc* ~~-- * a duty to look carries with it the 
duty to see what is there to be seen." 
We submit that none of the plaintiffs should recover 
in this case for an accident which was caused solely by the 
negligent act of a driver who could have seen, if he had 
looked with purpose. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF, P. K. EDMUNDS, FOR THE REASON 
THAT SAID PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLI-
GENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
All that has been said regarding the conduct of plain-
tiff, P. K. EDMUNDS, as negligent and as the sole cause of 
the injuries suffered by all the plaintiffs, applies with special 
emphasis to him. 
Without repetition of argument already made, de-
fendants will limit their argument on this aspect of the 
case to references to the cases where claimants have been 
denied recovery because of their own fault. 
To begin with, it is an elementary proposition that 
every person is under a duty to use reasonable care for his 
own safety, which includes, of course, a duty to keep a 
reasonable lookout under all conditions where danger would 
be reasonably anticipated. The following cases are among 
those in which this court has spoken so often on this 
subject: 
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Scoffield v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 1 Utah 2, 218, 265, 
P2, 396. 
Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 229 P2, 874. 
There are many Utah decisions involving automobile 
accidents where plaintiffs have been denied recovery be-
cause of their failure to look and to maintain a lookout 
for danger which they saw or should have seen. The 
following are representative: 
Spackn~an v. Carson, supra. 
Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P2, 495 
Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P2, 437 
Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2, 378, 294 P2, 788. 
There are of course many cases dealing with automo-
bile accidents where drivers have driven into excavations 
and holes in public highways. 
In Utah, Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, supra, is 
typical. That case differs somewhat in its facts from this 
case because the plaintiff in that case was a guest and also 
in the fact that the accident happened at night on a high-
way which was in use, but through which a cut had been 
made for a culvert. The driver in that case ran into a 
barricade with a red lantern on each end. The lanterns 
were visible for 600 feet, but the barricade was not seen 
by the driver until he was just a few feet away from it. In 
that case this court discussed the negligence of the driver 
for paying no heed to the lanterns and driving into a cloud 
of dust which obscured his vision and concluded that such 
conduct was negligent as a matter of law and the sole 
cause of the accident. We think that case is pertinent in 
principle to this case, imposing a duty upon a driver to 
keep a proper lookout and to pay attention to his surround-
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ings and what is visible in his path ahead. In this case it 
should be observed that Edmunds does not deny that he 
saw the cut in the highway; he did see it, but wants to 
excuse himself on the ground that he mistook it for some-
thing else. Having seen something in the highway ahead 
of him, he should have slowed down until he could deter-
mine what it was in fact. 
In Christensen v. Grays Harbor County, Wash., 210 
P2 69 3, a jury verdict in defendant's favor was affirmed 
in a case where a driver drove into a chuckhole. That court 
concluded that a driver is under a duty to avoid difficulties 
and obstructions which could be seen by exercise of reason-
able care. 
In Denny v. Garavaglia, Mich. 52 NW2, 521, a driver 
was denied recovery for injuries. sustained when at night 
he drove into a hole extending half way across a highway 
only 18 inches deep and filled with water. The court in 
that case pointed out that there was a warning sign several 
hundred feet from the point of accident cautioning drivers 
to go slow and indicating road repairs were in progress. 
The court held a reasonably careful person would have 
given heed to the sign. That case was much stronger in 
favor of the plaintiff than this one and yet in that case 
recovery was denied. All of the many indications open and 
apparent to Edmunds if he had looked and paid attention 
made his conduct inexcusable. In this case there was a 
sign, among other things, in plain view of P. K. Edmunds, 
warning him that the old road was closed. His failure to 
see or heed it was inexcusable. 
See also Marshall v. City of Baton Rouge, La. 3 2 So. 2, 
469 
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Ritter v. Olson, Pa. 68 Atl. 2, 732 
Price v. City of Monroe, N.C. 68 SE2, 283 
Arceneaux v. Louisiana Highway Commission, La. 15 
So.2, 638 
The last before mentioned case was one where plaintiff's 
chauffeur ran into a hole in a public highway. That 
court held that the plaintiff could not recover for his in-
JUries. The following is part of the opinion of the court: 
((* * * There should be no recovery because the 
hole was open and apparent and could easily have 
been seen and should have been seen by. plaintiff's 
driver and therefore, if plaintiff's driver drove the 
said automobile into the hole, the accident resulted 
from his contributory negligence." 
The court said further: 
((The record creates in our mind a conviction that 
the hole was (unseeable' to Smith only because he 
did not see it because he was paying no attention 
whatever to the road ahead :_'!. * * ." 
Rohman v. Richmond Heights, Mo. 135 SW2, 378, 
is a case very similar to this case and well illustrates why 
the plaintiff, P. K.. Edmunds, should not recover at all. 
The court, in deciding that case, made the following 
observations: 
tc::- ::- :_'!. Where the driver has knowledge that the 
street is in a difficult condition or that construction 
or repair work is in progress on the street, he may 
not assume that the street is reasonably safe for 
travel. Nor does the rule excuse the traveller in any 
case from the exercise of his faculties to discover 
and avoid obvious dangers. No one may be excused 
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from seeing that which is in plain view and which 
he could readily see by the exercise of due care 
* * * " 
H:l- * :t- he is not only required to look but to look 
in such an observant manner as to enable him to 
see the conditions which a person in the exercise 
of due care and caution for his own safety and the 
safety of others would have seen under like or sim-
ilar circumstances and it is as much negligence to 
fail to see that which can be observed by due care 
as it is negligence not to look at all. * ::- ::- not to 
see what is plainly visible when there is a duty to 
look constitutes negligence." 
That Court said further: 
::- :t- ::- ((This ·Condition of the backfill was in plain 
view. It was broad daylight at the time of the acci-
dent. ::- * ::- nevertheless, plaintiff in broad day-
light drove his car heedlessly onto this rough and 
dangerous fill at such a high rate of speed that when 
it hit one of the holes in the fill it jumped up in the 
. " a1r. 
((To allow plaintiff to recover under the facts 
as shown by his own evidence would be to reward 
him for his own reckless conduct that endangered 
not only his own life but the lives of others right-
fully using the street." 
Finally, the Court says: 
tt ::- ::- * but saying he (plaintiff) could not see 
what was in plain view in broad daylight is without 
probitive force." 
Plaintiff in that case was denied recovery because of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
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See also: 
Miller v. Baltimore, Md., 157 Atl. 289 
Taeckerv. Pickus, So. Dakota 235 NW 504 
Abraham v. Sioux City, Iowa 250 NW 461 
Schawe v. Leyendecker, Texas 269, SW 864 
Presley v. C. M. Allen c5 Co. Inc., N. C. 66 SE2, 789 
It is to be observed that in all of the cases quoted above, 
the accidents occurred on highways which were actually 
in use and not on highways which had been abandoned and 
withdrawn from use. That being so, even assuming, in this 
case, that the old roadway was in fact still a highway or 
that it presented the appearance of a highway, which the 
plaintiffs were invited to use, the plaintiff P. K. Edmunds 
should not be permitted any recovery because he should 
have seen the drainage cut in ample time to have stopped 
before running into it. That being so, we submit the 
judgment in his favor must be reversed. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
NEW TRIAL AS TO PLAINTIFFS ELLA M. ED-
MUNDS, CHARLOTTE EDMUNDS, FRANKLIN 
EDMUNDS, JOHN EDMUNDS AND ANN ED-
MUNDS FOR THE REASON THAT THE DAMAGES 
AWARDED TO, SAID PLAINTIFFS ARE EXCESSIVE, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The recital in the record of the injuries to the four 
minors, CHARLOTTE, FRANKLIN, JOHN AND 
ANN EDMUNDS shows beyond question that they re-
ceived no injury in the accident worthy of mention. They 
had a few bruises and one of them, just which one, is not 
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clear, had a small cut. They received no treatment of any 
kind. (Tr. 178, 183, 189). 
In spite of the lack of any evidence of material injur-
ies the jury awarded these children each $500.00 damages. 
It is submitted that these awards were grossly excessive and 
manifested a disposition on the part of the jury to give away 
the defendant's money, not to award a sum commensurate 
with injury actually sustained. 
The trial court refused to rectify the jury's error or 
to modify the verdict or to grant a new trial. It is sub-
mitted that this action entitled defendants to a new trial. 
Although a judgment for $500.00 may appear to be small, 
as judgments go in personal injury cases in these days, 
when the evidence shows that an award given by a jury 
is ten times as much as it should have been, the injustice 
should not be allowed to go unnoticed or uncorrected. 
The judgment in favor of plaintiff Ella M. Edmunds 
had more basis in reality than the cases of the children, but 
nonetheless, it too, was grossly excessive. Mrs. Edmunds 
was X-rayed to determine the extent of her injuries, but 
she never was treated (Tr. 180). There were no fractures 
and all evidence of injury had disappeared in three to four 
weeks. In the mean time, she carried on all her household 
duties without interruption (Tr. 180-182). She charac-
terized her injuries as slight or not serious with uneventful 
and full recovery ( T r. 18 8-191) . In less than a week after 
the accident Mrs. Edmunds acted as her husband's chauf-
feur, driving him to Las Vegas and then returned home 
by bus (Tr. 105, 106). Three weeks later she went to 
California and drove her husband back home (Tr. 106-
111). There was no justification for awarding this plain-
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tiff $2500.00. It is submitted that as a matter of law the 
defendants are entitled fo a new trial to correct the intem-
perate action of the jury. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 2, 9, 12 AND 17. 
Defendants complain of . error • commit~ed by the 
court in instructing the jl,J.ry. The first of these errors 
occurred in Instruction N 6. 2. In paragraph two of this 
·instruction the following language appears: 
((The plaintiffs claim that the defendants were 
guilty of negligence in failing to place barriers, 
obstacles or other devices to warn travellers of an 
excavation across the roadway." 
It is submitted that the reference to an excavation· across 
((the roadway" was misleading and erroneous. All the 
evidence shows conclusively that at the place where this 
cut was made there was in fact no roadway, either author-
ized or in use. The old roadway had ceased to be a roadway 
long before the accident. The fencing of it, the twenty 
cuts across its length, the obliteration of the ends of the 
old highway on the North and South, all precluded it from 
being described as a highway. 
The vice in this instruction is that it permitted the 
jury to speculate that the defendants may have been using 
the old road on the day of the accident as a matter of right 
and that hence the defendants were under a duty to place 
warning signs and barricades at the point where the ex-
cavation was made. At least the jury should have been 
instructed that before they could find negligence, they 
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should first find that the old highway was still in use or that 
there were no indications that it was not to be used. 
Again, in Instruction No. 9, the Court referred to 
the excavation as having been made in a ((roadway." There 
can be no question but what the state was at liberty to.close, 
cut through or do anything else to the old roadway neces-
sary to preserve and maintain the new road. For this rea-
son the term ((roadway" applied to the place of accident 
was inapplicable and was misleading to the jury. 
Defendants particularly complain of Instruction No. 
12; this instruction was little, if any, removed from the 
scope of a directed verdict for the plaintiffs. It was er-
roneous for the reason that it permitted the jury to consider 
the old roadway as part of the highway in the face of the 
uncontradicted evidence that it was not a part of the high-
way intended for travel from the time the new section of 
highway was opened for public use. After the opening of 
the new highway, the defendants, under the direction of 
the state, barricaded the old highway at both ends and at 
other points where it intersected public cross-roads. (Tr. 
289). Signs were posted advising travellers that the old 
road was closed. It was then fenced off at at least six dif-
ferent places and twenty drainage and irrigation cuts were 
made through it. After all this had been done this old road-
way by no stretch of the imagination could be considered 
a ttroadway" in the sense that it was intended for travel. 
This instruction was further erroneous because it 
stated that defendants were in some way bound to exclude 
travellers without any limitation as to the steps required 
to accomplish such exclusion. Just how the plaintiffs or 
anyone else could have been so completely excluded from 
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the old road as to absolutely prevent its use does not appear 
in this record. We think that the instruction was too broad 
and was misleading to the jury. Furthermore, after No-
vember 19, 1955, when the state assumed full control of 
the whole project, including the old roadway, the defend-
ants were under no duty or obligation during this period of 
suspension of work to exclude anybody from using the old 
highway. They were fully relieved of all duty toward the 
plaintiffs on the day of the accident. Any duty in this 
respect at that time rested upon the State of Utah. Finally, 
the opening of the new road and its acceptance relieved the 
defendants from any liability for accident occurring on 
any part of the project from that time on. ( 13 A.L.R.2, 
191; 58 A.L.R.2, 865, supra and cases therein cited.) 
The last paragraph of Instruction No. 17 invited the 
jury to award damages to all the plaintiffs for future dis-
ability. Defendants excepted to this charge because the 
record shows without any dispute that none of the plain-
tiffs except P. K. Edmunds made any claim of future 
disability or permanent injury. The four children recov-
ered ·Completely from their superficial injuries and plain-
tiff Ella M. Edmunds was fully recovered in three to four 
weeksfollowingtheaccident (Tr.178, 181-183, 188-191). 
To permit the jury to speculate concerning future disabil-
ity and injury to these plaintiffs was manifestly erroneous 
and an error entitling the defendants to a new trial. The 
size of the verdicts in favor of these plaintiffs was so dis-
proportionate as to leave the impression that the jury was 
misled by the trial court's error. 
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POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS RE-
QUESTED BY DEFENDANTS. 
Of the twenty-two numbered instructions requested 
by defendants, the trial court gave but one as requested and 
the substance of one other. These requests set out the de-
fendants' theory of the case and defendants were entitled 
to have them given. 
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines, 75 Utah 87, 283 
Pac. 160 
Defendants do not desire to argue extensively the 
action of the trial court in denying their requests, but 
attention should be directed to some of them. 
By its refusal to give Instruction No. 7, the court de-
nied the right of the defendants to have the jury instructed 
upon the duty of plaintiff Ella M. Edmunds to keep a look-
out. That she was under such a legal duty is clear. Her 
duty to look was not as imperative as the duty of the driver, 
but none the less she was under a duty to pay attention to 
obvious danger seen by her and warn the driver. (Nielsen 
v. Christensen-Gardner, supra). In refusing to give this 
request and failing to give an adequate instruction on the 
subject, the jury was entitled to assume that Mrs. Edmunds 
was under no duty whatsoever to see dangers plainly appar-
ent to her and give some warning thereof. Ella M. Edmunds 
admits that she saw the cut in the road, as did her husband. 
She affirmed the clearness of the day, the unlimited vis-
ibility and that objects could be seen at great distance (Tr. 
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18 6-18 8). The undisputed fact that she saw the cut en-
titled defendants to the requested instruction. 
Requested Instructions Nos. 15, 19, · 2 0 and 21 were 
in conformity with defendahts' theory of the· case and were 
supported by the evidence. Defendants' theory, as reflected 
by said requested instructions, has been extensively argued 
in the main portion ofthis brief and need not be repeated. 
If the case should be ·remanded for a new trial, this court 
should instruct the ·trial court that these requests should 
be given; We earnestly contend that a jury could find from 
the evidence that plaintiff P. K. Edmunds was on sufficient 
notice that the old road had been closed to require him, 
in the exercise of reasonable ·Care, to travel . on the new 
highway and that his failure to do so constituted negligence. 
Defendants further submit that the record and the law 
would likewise support a verdict that defendants had been 
relieved of all liability with respect to the old road by the 
state's assumption of use and control of the new road. If 
the new road was open no duty rested upon either the State 
of Utah or the defendants to keep the old road safe for 
travel. 
The record in this case discloses as conclusively as one 
could ever require that the accident to the plai~tiffs on 
November 27, 1955, was caused by the sole negligence of 
the plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, in driving his automobile in 
broad daylight into a 27 ft. cut through an abandoned 
public highway which was in plain view by the exercise of 
reasonable care and that defendants were guilty of no 
negligence in any way causing or contributing to said 
accident. 
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This re.cord also shows that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing 
to see this cut and avoid running into it and that all the 
circumstances surrounding the accident put him on notice 
that the abandoned highway had been withdrawn from 
travel. Consequently defendants were entitled to directed 
verdicts as to all plaintiffs and especially so with respect to 
plaintiff P. K. Edmunds. 
The verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, Ella M. Ed-
munds and CHARLOTTE, FRANKLIN, JOHN and 
ANN EDMUNDS were grossly excessive for the amount 
of injury sustained by them, assuming that said plaintiffs 
were entitled to recover at all. 
Finally, the trial court's error in instructing and in 
refusing to give instructions requested by defendants pre-
vented them from obtaining a fair trial. 
It is submitted that the judgments of the trial court 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER and 
ALBERT R. BOWEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
